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Under the cloak of this Tolstoyian title, I would
like to take up a highly controversial matter, the matter of
Berlin, and I would like to take it up in terms that court
disagreement. But one trouble with foreign policy, like this
convocation series thus far, is that there is not too much
disagreement and controversy, but too little. In my own limited way, in discussing the problem of Berlin in the context of
the broader topic of war and peace, I should like to contribute to making up the lack.
It is tragically understandable that we Americans
are perturbed and perplexed about the problem of Berlin. It
is a vexatious problem. But we are talking here about Berlin
in relation to war and peace.
Words like "perturbed" and
"perplexed" and "vexatious" are not words properly applied to
a problem inv~lving the issue of war or peace. Maybe they
were once. But today, in the thermonuclear age, war or peace
not only means victory or defeat; war or peace today means
survival or extinction. One cannot talk sanely about any
problem in international relations--let alone Berlin--unless
this cardinal fact is kept in mind.
Now under what conditions does one sanely undertake
extinction? Under what conditions does one consider certain
death? There may be those, employing the grisly neo-logic and
neo-morality of Herman Kahn and the Rand Corporation, who de-
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bate about what survival of a thermonuclear holocaust means;
whether it· means 100 million killed or only 50 million. But
I am not among them. Such aebate has all the reality of medieval polemics about how many angels on the head of a pin. It
is qUite true that, if there were a thermonuclear war, some
Americans might survive--perhaps millions--although under what
conditions of fallout and radioactivity one can only speculate
in horror--some might survive, but I defy any sane and honest
person to challenge me when I say that under no possible, conceivable circumstances could the American system of demociacy
and humanism and free private enterprise survive a thermonuclear war. The apparent failure of American public leaders to understand this fact is perhaps the greatest danger
we face, and the failure of American public leaders to make
it clear to our people is their most awful dereliction of
duty.

Now, does this mean that under no conceivable conditions one should risk thermonuclear war? I respect those
who answer in the affirmative, but I cannot agree. I can conceive of conditions in which a thermonuclear war--with all its
immorality and horror and illogic--should be risked. Some,
but not very many. But that there may be any at all only
testifies to the madness of the world we live in.
Essentially,
the only conditions under which it would ever be permissible
to risk thermonuclear war would be those in which .a vital interest of the United States was threatened, in which our security was directly menaced. This is one reason--and the
most important one--why a review of what constitutes vital
American interests, of what constitutes a menace to our security, is long overdue.
Let me say before going any further--and let me say
it as emphatically as I can--that I am profoundly convinced
there is no conceivable justification for considering that
Berlin today rationally involves the question of peace or war.
I do not doubt the honesty o;f those of our leaders who tell us
that it does. But I do doubt their ability, their judgment,
their knowledge, their obje-ctivity and their sense of perspective
and proportion. They are, after all, the same men who were
telling us just a few short months ago that the problem of Laos
presented to us the question of war or peace--the problem of
Laos, that was created or~ginally by American intervention to
overthrow a constitutionally established and popularly supported
government. The problem of Laos is now fading to obscurity
because those people who told us that it involved the question
of war or peace are accepting the same government whose over-
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throw we originally accomplished, and are abandoning the
regime for which they told us we might have to go to war.
Those people who are telling us Berlin involves the question
of war or peace are the same people, also, who so sadly compromised us in Cuba an even shorter time ago because they do
not know hoVi to recognize a social revolution when they see
one and seem to know as little about Communism as they do
about international politics, which is very little indeed.
Must I now accept without question the judgment of these
same men that whether I and- my family, and you and your families, and we and our country, and our society and its civilization, live or die is to be determined by what happens in
Berlin?
I agree just as much as anyone that, as the saying
has it, we should not give in to the Soviet Union, or to anybody else, where our vital .interest, our security, is at stake.
And I agree just as much as anybody that, as the saying has it,
we should not let ourselves "be pushed around by the Russians."
But the truth is that our vital interest and our security are
not involved in Berlin and that the Russians are not "pushing
us around. II A great deal of contrary t~lk is coming out of
Washington these days, and this, then, becomes the basis for
even wilder newspaper talk. If any of this has any other purpose than to whip up a war hysteria, I don't know what it is o
Admittedly Southern California is ' an unusual case study in
this regard. But this matter of Berlin is distorted out of
all recognition not only in our Southern California but throughout the nation. I would be willing to bet ten dinars to a
ruble, that very, very few peop~e, here or elsewhere, who
accept this extreme view of the matter even know what the
Russians are really proposing about Berlino

in fact, are they proposing? Not· that the
United States be "pushed out of Berlin." We would be perfectly right in refusing to be "pusl}.ed out of Berlin," but
the Russians are n~t proposing this. We are right, too, in
feeling that '/,e have commitments to the West Berliners--IIthe
freedom-loving West-Berliners,--to save them from Communism,"
as the saying goes o Having made so loudly and so often these
commi tments--whether they are wise .o r not--we cannot, of
course., suddenly ignore them noVi. But the .R ussians are not
asking for this, either. What the Russians want to do, they
say, is to make a Ger~an peace treaty that would normalize
and formalize their East German State and the Oder-Niesse
boundary w~th Poland, and normalize and formalize the highly
abnormal division of Berlin.
Specifically, ~~. Khrushchev
W.ha-~,
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says, such treaty could provide for stationing of Amerioan
and other Western troQPs in West Berlin. It could provide,
he says, even that which we d~ntt have now, despite some
assertions to the contrary--legal right of access through
the territory of East Germany. Do we want this? Or if we
don't, why? And what do we want? To answer these questions,
it is necessary to look at Berlin in the larger context of
Germany.

The problem of Berlin arose as a result of the fourpower occupation of Germany following the defeat of the Nazis.
Germany was, as you all know, divided into zones, with the
Soviet armed forces controlling the Eastern zone--roughly that
area already occupied by them at the end of the war--and two
Western zones, one for the Americans and one for the British;
and the Americans subsequently brought in the French, to whom
was given control of a part of our original zone. Each military commander was to have absolute authority on political
matters in his own zone, subject to the proviso that matters
affecting the whole of Germany, especially economic matters,
were to be determined by a quadripartite allied control council situated in Berlin. Berlin itself was divided into four
sectors, one for each occupying power. And Berlin was deep
inside the Soviet zone. There is room for questioning the wisdom of the details of this arrangement--which resulted from
the Yalta and Potsdam conferences--and even more room for
criticizing the failure of the Americans and their Western
allies to obtain a formal agreement guaranteeing them free
access at all times to West Berlin, but it does little good
to dwell on these pOints now.

'!rhe aim of this arrangement-agreed on by all concerned--waa that after taking of reparations and reordering
German political and economic life, the four zones would be
unified into a Single German state.
Meanw.hile, at Potsdam,
the powers agre~d to a revision of Germany's Eastern borders,
in favor of the Poles and the Russians. The boundary tentatively agreed on was roughly along the line of the Oder and
Niesse Rivers, with this line to be ratified, give or take a
lit~le here or there, by a
German peace treaty later. This
peaoe treaty has never been worked out, and that is, in part,
what Khrushchev wants now. One reason why there was no peace·treaty is that quadripartite control of Germany broke down almost before it began. It is fashionable in the United States
to put the blame for this break-down altogether on the Soviet
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Union, just as it is fashionable in the USSR to put the blame
altoget her on the United States. Both were guilty, and in
just about equal degree. But there was also the disruptive
role of the French, who never signed the Potsdam agreement
even when they were made an occupying pov/er. Paris insisted
that if the USSR and Poland were to bet part of Germany on the
East, France dhould get part of Germany on the West o And failing this, the French obstructed the work of the Allied Control
Council, which, consequently, was unable to establish all-German political parties, labor organizations, postal system or
anything else.
Meanwhile, the Russians--destroyed, impoverished and
greedy--began an action Which certainly violated the Potsdam
agreement in spirit if not in letter--the taking of reparations
from their zone of Germany by operating factories on the spot
and shipping off all the production to the USSR, rather than
by the slovler and supposedly agreed upon process of dismantlini5 .
This caused a strain on the occupation economy in all zones and
ha d a severe inflationary effect. The West retaliated by reneging on promised reparations shipments from its zones to the
USSR. Moscow in turn retaliated by reneging on promised food
and fertilizer shipments from its zone to the Western zones.
Then the Western powers, perhaps necessarily but still in clear
violation of the treaty, adopted a West zonal currency and prepared to merge their three zones into one. It was in retaliation for this that Moscow in 1948 began the Berlin Blockade.

By now the wartime agreements on Germany were already, as I~. James P. Warburg says, a dea~ letter. The cold
war was well under way_ And the United States was committed
to the idea, long propagated by men like the late James V.
Forrestal, that it was necessary to build up Germany as a military buffer to Soviet powe~. To accomplish this, the Western powers, under American leadership, -~ook a fateful step
that changed the Whole complexion of the German situation.
They established their merged Western zones into a new, separate, independent German state--Ylest Germany. Originally
the rationale for the western powers being in Berlin was that
this was necessary for quadripartite control and administra- '
tion of Germany, looking toward a unified German state with
Berlin as its capital. The Western action in establishing a
'{ lest German state brought an abrupt end to this rationale. As
many foresaw, the Soyiet Union almost immediately followed
suit and created an East German state under its domination.
There were now t . .7 0 German states, east and west, Olle as valid
and as legal as the other.
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At this pOint some kind of German unification might
still have been possible. It was now made virtually impossible.
not by Soviet action but by American action in launching the
militarization of the West German state. There was already,
it is true, a sizeable police force in existence in East Germany. While the evidence is that these so-called East German
"alert groups" were primarily for the purpose .of asserting
Communist control, they did provide a nucleus on which an
army could be built. But they were not an ar.my. The only
real military force in East Germany was the Soviet Army, just
as the only real military force in West GermaIl1' was the American army, backed by British and French troops.

The Americans and some of their Western allies, however, were obsessed with fear of Soviet military aggression,
with fear that suddenly the Soviet army might begin a march
toward the English Channel. One does not have to debate here
the validity of this fear, although, as some o~ you know, I
am firmly in agreement with George Kennan and many others who
feel that such a danger of Soviet military aggression never
existed. To guard against it, however, the Americans and their
allies organized the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO
then, as NATO up until recently, consisted primarily of American troops and a paper organization. It was apparent that if
NATO was ever to be anything else, it would have to have participation by West Germany, already beginning its amazing economic recovery.
Accordingly, the Americans took the second
fateful step, beginning--against the violent opposition of not
only the USSR but many others--the militarization of West Germany. The government of Konrad Adenauer, if not its people,
were more than willing.
Soon the Soviet Union again followed
suit and militarized East Germany.
Now ostensibly our. goal was still Unification--or by
this time, better stated, reunification--of Germany. There
was, obviously, only one way this could ever be accomplished,
and this was by agreement with the Soviet Union. But the
Soviet Union made it clear over and over again that they would
never agree to reunification if it meant the possibility of
a rearmed Germany in NATO. The United States, meanWhile, had
oriented its whole European policy around the idea of a strong
NATO, which meant German participatioh. That being the basis
of our 'policy, it followed that we would not agree that a reunified Germany must be excluded from NATO. The result was
that there were never--at any time--any real negotiations on
German reunification. It is a misstatement of fact bordering
on falsehood to say, as Secretary Dulles and President Eisen-
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hower once said, that the Soviet Union agreed at the 1955 Summit
Conference to reunification by free elections and then went
back on its pledge. The Soviet agreement was only on condition
that the reunified German state be excluded from NATO, and to
this we would not consent.

~ytt"ment'»igM-k

~~tassi£ff.::••

Would the Russians ever have agreed to a reunified
Germany on terms we could have accepted? Maybe not. But we
don't know. In the apt words of . George Kennan, "we shall never
know whether the Russi~s will go through an .o pen door until
we stop trying to push them through a closed one." Why might
the Russians ' have agreed to go through an open door, that is,
c.onsented to a non-Communist and neutral r'eunified Germany?
One reason is that this would have formalized the territorial
arrangements in Eastern Europe. Another is that it would have
removed Western troops from the border of this vital Soviet
core interest.
A third is that it would ;lave remov,e d from ·the
heart of Europe a problem which, unsolved, constantly threat,ened
t .o disrups th:e peace. There are two inaications that the Russians
might have gone through an open door if we had stopped trying to
force them through a closed one. One indication was the Soviet
endorsement of proposals for mutual disengagement of troops
from Central Europe and even from parts of their own ~ast~rn
Europe--proposals which we refused to discuss. Another indication ~s what happened in East GermrulYo The ' East German
state is, of course, a Soviet puppet, tight under the Soviet
thumb, and always has been. But it is highly significant
that there had taken place no full socialization in East Germany, of the type that 1Dok place in the Eastern European
satellites. Neither full nationalization nor any collectivization of agriculture to speak of had been undertaken; there
even existed the shells of opposition political parties, however meaningless. It was only in 1958, when West Germ~was
well on its way to full rearmament and completely integrated
in the Western system, and when disengagement was turned down
as a subject for discussion, ,t hat the full satellization of
East Germany took place and that East Germany became , fully integrated into the Soviet bloc and ' given an equal status with
the other satellite states.

~~t~ passwiJi1Us VMH,s~•• ~
Up until this time, the rationale for Western presence in Berlin--now no longer legal--was diplomatic. ~hat
is, it was a gambit ~n the politics of reunification, and as
such it, made sense. Since Berlin was symbolic as the traditional capital of 'Germany, Western presence there, keeping the
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city from full Communist influence, might have been a factor
in the kind of reunification and in the orientation of a reunified German state. But now reunification was out of the question.
No longer did the Russians want it, if they ever did. And the
West Germans, and the American!! also, did not want it, no
matter what they said; or if they did want it, the methods
they pursued--insistence on a reunified Germany in NATO--now .
more clearly than ever _prevented the wish from having any real
meaning. This being the case, even the diplomatic rationale
for our being in Berlin--that it was a maneuver concerned with
reunification--vanished.
It was at this time that Khrushchev broached tne idea
of a German peace treaty and an alteration of the situation in
Berlino

It is necessary here to say a word about West Germany. It is important to realize that West Germany is by
far and away the strongest nation in Europe, economically
and militarily also, if the USSR is excluded. It dominates
the Common Market. Among the non-American members, it dominates NATO. And the fact is that West Germany has come also
to dominate American policy in Europe.
Now West Germany, just like all other st ates, has
its own intrerests, German interests. These are not American
interests, except, perhaps, incidentally. This is entirely
natural. Bu~ it is not entirely natural that the United States
continues to act as though Germany interests were always and
necessarily our own interests. The West made this mistake
about Germany once before, after the Locarno Treat yo The
British and French actually expected Germany to help them
maintain the Versailles Treaty, Which was aimed against Germany. Operating on the incredibly naive assumption that because Foreign Minister Stresemann talked a good game of
"Western unity," the British and French never suspect·ed that
he was, at the same time, beginning the secret and illegal rearmament of Germany th~t was to have its tragiC climax in the
Gotterdammerung of World War II.
Now I do not think that the West German state is
like the Nazi Reich--although it does have many former Nazis
in high places--nor that it has intentions of trying to dominate Europe militarily.
But I do think that West Germany, in
furthering of German interests as it sees them, is a provocative,
disruptive force which as much as any other single factor stands
in the way of a peaceful European settlement. In one way, the
West . German policy has t£e result--whether or not the intention--
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of doing exactly what Nazi policy sought to do--which is to
cause conflict between the United states and the Soviet Union,
albeit f or different reasons.

I"t mus ·t; be remembered that Germans are Germans.

To

say this is not to make an invidious slur on a whole people.
But it is to say that politically the Germans, en masse, as
a social group, have repeatedly demonstrated their political
immaturity. And I, for one, can see nothing in the policy
of West Germany now that demonstrates otherwise.
Certainly American policy cannot escape some onus
here. We do not have to do what the West Germans want us to
do. The impact of the war created a profound anti-militarism
among Germans., especially young Germans. It is thanks to our
own efforts, in part, that they now have a government which is
thoroughly militarily oriented and which is steadily becoming
more so. This has come so gradually that one is hardly aware
of it. I well recall being in Frankfurt and Bonn in 1950, on
a mission for the U.S. State Department, when there were newspaper reports that the West German government had a "defense
adviser." This was indignantly denied by both the Americans
and the Germans, although everybody knew it was true. Then it
was admitted, but the West Germans said, solemnly, no defense
ministry. A few months later the defense adviser became minister
of defense, but, the West Germans said, no army. A few months
later there began to be organized a German army, but said the
West Germans, no traditional uniforms and no generals.
A few
months later the army donned the traditional uniforms and the
rank of general was reestablished, but, it was said, no general
staff, and so on. About the same time West Germany adopted as
its national anthem the infamous "Deutschland uber Alles," but,
it was said, the first verse, containing the offensive words,
would not be used. Now the ~them begins, as before, "Deutschland, Deutschland, uber Alles." Goethe, in an untypical poetic
burst of patriotism, once wrote that when he thought of ~ermany
he could not sleep. It is not surprising that today a gr.eat
many other people capnot sleep when they think of Germany--but
for other reasons.

wlig tk 811m umnutttHt r~eipasr-WIWst1#tmmts .-The provocative .aspect of West German policy is illustrated in the altogether unwarranted claim of the Adenauer
government to jurisdiction of Berlin. It is illustrated by
the refusal to accept the Oder-Niesse line. It is illustrated
by the inclusion in the Bonn government of a "minister of all-
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German affairs" and by West Germany's refusal--backed by the
United States--to recognize the East German government and by
its use of diplomatic .pressure on any state that does recognize it. Perhaps the single largest identifiable political
group in West Germany is the . so-called Volksdeutsche, those
Germans who fled or were expelled from the Prussian provinces
now part of Poland and Russia, from the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia and from other parts of Eastern Europe. They tend to
be strident nationalists. What the Volksdeutsche want"of
course, is a return to Germany of their property.' They are
dispossessed and desperate. Officially they abjure thoughts
of war. But how they expect to achieve a return of territory
from Poland and the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, they don't
say. These Volksdeutsche are a significant factor in the Bonn
government's refusal to accept the post-war settlements. And
the West German policy is a significant factor in the American
refusal to accept them.

Wh:/ JUJ Jfti({futY d1stngRgtmt;~ ••
West German policy is not only provocative but arrogantly so. The one hope of a real German settlement might have
been military disengagement, and at one point President Eisenhower seems to have considered this idea. But the West German
government as much as said, "you can't adopt such a ,policy,"
t hat is, having rearmed, they were not going to disarm and the
United States couldn't make them. It was right here in Claremont, in 1958, in Bridges Auditorium, that the German Ambassador, Dr. Grewe, publicly defied the United States in ' th~s regard.
He was not arrogant in tone, but that is the only word for the
content of his remarks. He was, as I recall, applauded roundly.
Of course, the Wes~ Germans are right. It is now too
we can't make the Germans disarm if they don't want to.
And far from wanting to, they are now demanding nuclear weapons,
as they demanded in the past, successfully, operational bases
f or their troops in Western Europe. One might well ask, "Who
,'fon World War II, anyway?"

~ate;

In the same way, the West Germans are now calling
the tune on Berlin and are, in effect, dictating American policy. No compromise Qn Berlin, the West Germans say. And
why? Because Herr Adenauer insists that West Berlin is a part
of West Germany. He and his government insist that the East
German state has no right to exist. They insist on German 'unity, by which they simply mean expanding the present West German re'p 1.tblic to include all of Germany, including--including,
mind y ,'"": ",- -those former parts of Prussia now incorporated into
Poland and. the Soviet Union. A German peace treaty, such as
called for by Khrushchev, would, of course, "legalize" the di-
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vision · of Germany, would require the de facto if not de jure
recogni tion of East Germany and would force the West Germans
to accept the Oder-Niesse line.
Now obviously if the Soviet Union is to be defied on
these matters, it will be defied by the United States, not . by~
West Germany. Come on, say the West Germans, lets you defy the
Russians. One can excuse the West Germans for taking this line
more easily that one can excuse the Americans for falling for
it. Is it not time that we have a policy of our own on Berlin
and on Germany, reflecting American rather than German interests?

Just what American interests are affected by the Soviet
proposal on Berlin'? To answer this it must first be realized
that the present situation in Berlin is highly abnormal and impermanent by its very nature. I~ is absolute nonsense to talk
about this Berlin situation--as Secretary of State Rusk has
done--as being part of a "status quo" that must be ma.int ained
at all costs. It cannot be maintained indefinitely, no matter
what the Russians do or don't do. It is no policy at all to reiterate that we will "stand firm" in such a situation. And it
is only sophistry to assert--as President Kennedy "and others
have done--that since the United States is demanding no change
in the Berlin situation, the issue arises only because of
Soviet trouble-making. Our position in Berlin is untenable
militarily, diplomatically and legally. The handful of American troops in the city no more keeps the Russians out than does
the Claremont ROTC. If the Russians are kept out by anything
other than their own restraint, it is by American nuclear deterrent power. Meanwhile, peace treaty or no peace treaty, we
and the West Berliners are at the mercy of the Russians and
the East Germans. It is high time we faced up to this unpleasant fact.
There are a thousand and one things they could
do to make the whole jerry-built structure collapse any time
they wanted to. Merely changing the currency system would, as
Mayor Brandt has said, bring an economic collapse. Endless
examination of passage papers or constant repairs on roads and
bridges could halt our access. Are we prepared to go to war
over the Communists' right to change their own currency? Or
over their right to repairs roads and bridges? Or over the
extent of their burea,ucratic inefficiency?
The fact is that, given the unlikelihood of reunification and given the hard, cold realities of international politics, Berlin ultimately is almost certainly going to become
the capital of the state in which it is located--East Germany.
But we are not being asked to consider that. Compromises are
open to us. One does not have to agree with the Khrushchev pro-
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posals to see that the Soviet concern over the present situation is not unnatural. What is the present situation as it
must appear to Moscow? A western enclave ensconced far inside
one of their satellite states.
west Germany and the United
States refusing to recognize Eas·t Germany, refusing to accept
the Oder-Niesse line, talking about ending Soviet hegemony in
Eastern Europe. Even without their paranoia, the Russians
might see all this as a threat. The fact is that the Soviet
position on Berlin is not extreme, that it has not lacked restraint. Mr. Khrushchev has repeated over a period of years-at times almost plaintively--that he considers the present impermanent arrangement a source of instability in Central Europe
and that the USSR attaches great interest to a change.

Actually, it is by no means clear that our position
in Berlin might not actually be enhanced by a peace treaty
something like the one the Soviet Union proposes. If we want
to go to war over our rights in Berlin or over what the Communists might do to the freedom-loving people of ·West Berlin, we
can do so under conditions of a peace treaty as well as we can
now.
To say that the Soviet proposal does not adversely
affect our true interest in Berlin assumes, of course, that our
interest is in European stability and reduction of tensions.
There can be European stability and reduction of tensions, however, only if--lacking reunification of Germany--only if we-and Bonn--accept the reality of the East German state and the
Oder-Niesse line. On what basis have we thus far refused to
accept these realities? The implicit American assumption that
we had a right to create a West German state but that the Soviet
Union did not have a right to create an East German state is so
untenable that we do not even assert it in this fashion, but
that is what our position amounts to.
Do we expect the Soviet
Union to agree with us and, out of the goodness of its heart
and love of capitalism, voluntarily turn East Germany over to
west Germany and force the Poles to give up their new territories and restore the former Prussian city of Koenigsberg to a
Germany controlling NATO? If we don't expect this, what do we
expect? \Vhat do the West Germans expect? Presumably we do not
intend to try to bring about these changes by force, but can we
be sure, in the present milieu, the Russians--and the East Germans and the Poles--understand this? Actually our policy is
based on utter unreality. But can we expect to reassure the
Russians by saying, "We know our policy doesn I t make any sense,
but please believe it just reflects a lack of realism on our
part rather than an intention to force changes harmful to yoU]
interests"?
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No, of course, we cannot say this~ Nor does our government see it this way. Mr. Rusk recently referred to what
he called "the many contradictions and historical fallacies in
the present position of the Soviet leaders (on Germany).u As
one who accepts and defends the policies of Secretar'ies Acheson
and Dulles on Germany, Mr. Rusk ought to know a lot about contradictions and historical fallacies. But sometimes too much
of a concern with the mote in the eyes of others obscures the
mote in one's own eye.

~here has been a lot of talk about taking the initiati ve away from the Communists, and this is long overdue'. The
present Berlin situation would be a good place to start. Indeed, if we ~e not prepared to risk war in a vain attempt to
preserve a "status quo" ·that cannot be preserved and does not
~volve our vital interest in any event, and if we do not wish
to accept that Soviet proposal, there is no alternative to taking the initiative.
And in one sense that is just what Khrushchev is inviting us to do. Maybe we can't come up with a
workable proposal, but we will never know until we try.
There
are a number of obvious proposals that could be made. Senator
Mansfield has offered one--creating a united Berlin as a free
cj,.ty guaranteed by both NATO and Warsaw Pact and policed by "international peace teams." The Mansfield proposal may not be altogether realistic, but it is, at least, a proposal.
Another
would be demilitarization of both East and West Berlin, with the
latter in a special status. United Nations supervision of West
Berlin is also a possibility.
A joint East-West German condominium of the whole of Berlin is still another, and this by
no means exhausts the possibilities. But if we are to have
anything better than the Russians suggest, we must take the
initiative and propose something. The West Germans. of course,

will not like it. It is high time, I think, that the West
Germans be put in their place on this matter. It is high
time that American policy assert itself in behalf of real
American interests, not imagined American interes~s or West
German interests. I can think of no better place to start
than for our national leaders to make realistic r ·3 .ther than
propaganda statements aboll.t the whole issue to the American
people. It is such a course that takes real courage, rather
than the pseudo courage about standi~g firm and going to war,
and it is real courage alone that will preserve our interests
and integrity and at the same time spare us a thermonuclear
war. Which kind of courage our present leaders have, we may be
soon about to see.

THE FOUR HORSEMEN: Death, Famine, War
and Plague. By Albrecht Durer, famous
German Artist (1471-1528).

WILL THEY RIDE AGAIN?

